

Southeast Europe: Improving the Climate for Trade and Transport

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Executive Summary

High transaction costs and uncertainties surrounding trade have substantially limited economic development in Southeast Europe. The Trade and Transport Facilitation Program in Southeast Europe (TTFSE) has adopted a regional results-based approach to reducing the nontariff barriers that impede the flow of goods. The program has produced clear benefits – border crossings have been made far more efficient; trade has been facilitated; corruption at crossing points has been greatly reduced; customs revenue crucial to national budgets has improved. TTFSE focused primarily on a single mode (road transport) and was implemented in pilot sites at key border crossings in six (and then eight) countries. The encouraging results, lessons learned, and best practices of the TTFSE program provide a solid basis for a replicable, scalable model to facilitate transport and expand regional trade. A multimodal approach to pilot site selection is likely to be used in scaling up and replicating the program elsewhere.

The Need for Reform in Trade and Transport in Southeast Europe

High transportation costs and uncertainties in trade seriously constrained the economic development of Southeast Europe. Delays at border-crossing points and informal demands for “payments” were all too common. Strengthening the region’s competitiveness in the global market environment was essential, yet the impediments to border crossing created a disincentive to foreign investment, reducing opportunities for local firms, limiting employment opportunities, and raising the transaction costs for imports and exports. The lack of economic growth particularly penalized the poor through limited job opportunities, high prices of imported goods, and high costs for potential exports. With the creation of the new Balkan states, border problems proliferated.

Development Objectives of the TTFSE

The Trade and Transport Facilitation Program in Southeast Europe (TTFSE) was developed in order to reduce the nontariff costs of trade and transport and to fight smuggling and corruption at borders – while increasing revenue from trade. The challenge was no less than a transformation of the role of the border-crossing agency – from an obstacle to a facilitator of trade.

TTFSE approached these development objectives through five means. First, customs reform was supported. Second, interaction, cooperation, and communication were strengthened between border-control agencies and the trading community. Third, information and training were provided to the private sector. Fourth, financing was provided for infrastructure and

new equipment at selected border crossings. Finally, customs procedures, information technology, and human resource management were integrated.

Program Description

TTFSE is a regional partnership involving the World Bank, the European Union, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). Eight client countries are included – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. The partners focus on border issues and procedural reforms that facilitate trade. Under the program, transport is monitored according to clearly defined, standardized performance indicators at selected pilot sites in each country. The monitoring of performance indicators provides transparent documentation of progress.

By facilitating transport, the program strengthens a public-private partnership to improve trade. National “pro-committees” were established to improve communication between those who trade and the many transportation operators – providing, in effect, a form of institutional checks and balances. The committees help to monitor government regulation and service provision. TTFSE plays an important complementary role by making information more accessible – for example, through a regional Web site on matters that range from government legislation and new regulation to hours of operation at particular border crossings. Complementary professional training programs have been developed for certification of traders and operators.



The total cost of TTFSE was US\$123 million, of which US\$80 million was financed by loans and credits from the World Bank. Local counterpart funds and grants were provided from the United States, Austria, the Netherlands, France, and Norway. National sub-projects ranged in size from US\$9 million in Moldova to US\$27 million in Romania. Implementation began in late 2000, with subproject implementation averaging three to four years.

TTFSE has supplemented – though not replaced – other institutional mechanisms to improve communications among border control agencies. This includes a regional steering committee to which all countries participating in the program belong. Activity occurs not only at the border-crossing points, but at their agency headquarters and across the region.

As part of the program, participating countries agreed to adopt and collect data on two types of performance indicators – the performance and the efficiency of customs administrations. An Excel workbook was prepared to compile the data, both at a regional level and at pilot sites. Indicators were laid out in a methodology manual. Processing times at pilot sites were usually measured on a monthly basis, and overall customs performance was measured annually. The national customs administration of each country measured performance at its pilot sites. Consultants provided support. Data on the border crossing and clearance times – as experienced by users at the TTFSE pilot sites – are available from 1999 onward.

Key Elements in TTFSE's Approach

Regional participation. Undoing trade constraints meant that TTFSE projects had to be regionally linked. Participating countries needed to cooperate in order to resolve shared problems. A regional steering committee was created to assist in collaboration.

Reform, not provision of infrastructure. The TTFSE projects focused on customs reforms and integrated solutions that would increase the productivity of border agencies by faster processing time at border crossings and inland terminals, and they promoted transparency. The specifics of the reform varied from country to country. Since reform is an iterative process, TTFSE provided a dynamic definition of needs. It required periodic reviews of the results achieved and flagged the need for changes. Some border-crossing points needed to improve the design and scale of infrastructure in order to implement reform, yet in no case was infrastructure expanded without reform. Projects that included physical improvement were supported only after critical reform measures had been sufficiently achieved. This provided a solid incentive to move first on the policy front.

Duplication avoided by building upon structures, initiatives, and institutions already in place and working. Certain reforms were under way well before TTFSE was launched. TTFSE sought to build upon and reinforce existing national institutions rather than create new ones. This strategy included incorporating chambers of commerce and local pro-committees into project activities. Each project took into account ongoing reforms, reinforcing efforts by the European Union, international organizations, and other donors.

A participatory approach. TTFSE was designed and implemented with participatory methodology. All projects needed to be endorsed and owned by stakeholders that included government agencies, freight forwarders, customs brokers, transport operators, traders, end users, and other beneficiaries. Ownership through participation proved to be a strong driver of results. In addition to consultations during the design phase, mechanisms for recurrent user input were built into the monitoring and evaluation of each project.

Pilot-site starting points. Each TTFSE project first identified pilot sites for the application of reform. These included border-crossing points and inland clearance terminals. Reform goals were monitored through performance indicators that each pilot site agreed to. The experience at pilot sites created models for further replication. In Bulgaria, for example, the reform measures tested and replicated from the pilot sites will cover about half of all traffic coming into the country by the end of 2005.

A different model for the Caucasus and Central Asian regions. It should be noted that reform models adopted in the Caucasus and Central Asian regions are somewhat different from that of TTFSE. Reform in the Caucasus region started with policy dialogue and applied the trade facilitation toolkit launched under the Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade (www.gfptt.org). Trade facilitation groups, such as the pro-committees in the Balkan countries, were embryonic, so time was invested in establishing such groups. A coordinating committee was in place for the Transport Corridor Europe, Caucasus, and Central Europe (TRACECA). That committee was used, rather than a new regional steering committee; and a multimodal, multi-agency approach is under way. Variations are evolving in Central Asia, where replication of the TTFSE provides a good foundation for a region-specific program that will achieve long-lasting results.



Adaptations in Implementation

Taking political context into account. For reform to work, commitment at the highest level of government was necessary. The rate and extent of reform in each TTFSE country depended upon the perceived and actual extent of such political commitment. In some cases, a client agency's attention to the reform process was diverted by political issues over which it had no control. Considerations of this sort had to be factored into the analysis of each project. With scaling up as a goal, the weight of such risk increases. So mitigation measures needed to be anticipated at the outset and undertaken as needed.

Maintaining consistency with poverty reduction strategies. Consistency with ongoing poverty reduction strategies was ensured by linking TTFSE projects to the World Bank's country assistance strategy for respective countries. In presenting this linkage to national stakeholders, a critical point was emphasized – that the TTFSE program was not aimed at infrastructure development, but rather at reforming transport and trade to improve the business investment climate and therefore to benefit the poor.

Changing scale. Three changes in scale occurred in the TTFSE program design. First, the range of objectives was scaled back. Second, reforms began by focusing on scalable pilot sites rather than country-level initiatives. Third, the number of countries in the program increased from six to eight. The first two of these changes occurred during the design phase; the latter occurred as the first six country cases were being implemented.

Adjusting to interagency competition. Customs administration was TTFSE's primary beneficiary agency in most countries. Because access to loans and credits was restricted to customs, other border-crossing agencies were slower to appreciate the benefits of collaboration, and were more resistant to change. Interagency competition constrained the pace of implementation.

Persuading skeptics to take ownership. Ownership was a complex matter with so wide a range of stakeholders. Typically, the private sector was highly dubious about the integrity of customs administration. Although transport operators pressed hard and early for a program such as TTFSE, they were pessimistic, to say the least, regarding the extent and speed at which customs could be reformed. Accordingly, the capacity to publicly document performance and results was crucial. A demonstrably transparent track record served as the basis for public relations programs by customs administrations.

Responding to performance that is below expectations. Preliminary performance indicator results did not always meet performance expectations. Sometimes this occurred because of delays in implementation. Sometimes client agencies were overly optimistic about initial conditions or how long it would take to achieve objectives. It was sometimes necessary and realistic to scale down before scaling up.

Maintaining flexibility with an eye on results. Program design was flexible to facilitate minor adjustments in initial plans. Each country had its own needs and ideas on which investments would provide the best returns. Some plans for upgrading or adding infrastructure needed to be scaled back to conform to tougher projections for traffic demand. In some cases, modifying the layout of existing facilities made more sense than the ambitious expansion of facilities.

Results Achieved

Reduced waiting time. By the end of 2003, the waiting time for customs clearance at the first six pilot sites dropped by an average of 60 percent, from a low of 23 percent at one Romanian border-crossing point to 90 percent at a Macedonian border-crossing point. In part, these results reflect greater selectivity in inspections – that is, abandoning the policy of mandatory inspection of all trucks.

Economic savings. By the end of the first year of implementation, the overall cost savings from reduced waiting time in the initial six countries was estimated at \$8.4 million, well over US\$6 million a year. With the addition of Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro, estimated savings are now approaching \$US8 million annually. Scaling up to include all border-crossing points and inland terminals has doubled the annual savings to over US\$16 million. It could reach US\$25 million over the next few years. In addition, profits and fees were earned from increased or induced traffic. In Croatia, for example, revenue collected by customs doubled between 1999 and 2003.

Improved dialogue among customs administrations. Meetings of the regional steering committee greatly improved understanding of integrated border management, information sharing, and common issues. A regional information-technology working group was established. The steering committee meetings led to regional endorsement of international standards such as the International Weight Certificate. The steering committee meetings provided a forum for Moldovan customs to share their pilot experiences with single-window payments, an idea that could be replicated throughout the region.



Monitoring of performance, leading to improvements. A transparent, comparative public performance monitoring system, developed from a shared performance manual, was set up across the program pilot sites. This helped resolve procedural and logistical problems at particular sites; it facilitated performance comparison across sites; and it helped to flesh out new areas in need of reform. For example, early progress at an inland Macedonian clearance terminal (Kumanovo) began to falter. Analysis of the data enabled the staff to make changes that reduced clearance time to about half of its previous level. The indicators were also made public on the Internet. Private sector groups have participated in rolling out Internet access and have expressed interest in continued monitoring of the pilots after the TTFSE program closes.

User surveys made public. A specialized independent consultant undertook a consultation with 150 users of border-crossing agency services. Chambers of commerce, the pro-committees, and professional organizations from each country participated. This collaboration strengthened both the organizational and the methodological capacity of NGOs working with the trade and transport sectors. As part of the monitoring process, the surveys enabled users to publicly voice their concerns and to voice their degree of satisfaction with the pace, scope, and impact of change. Their scores helped to validate the performance indicator results, and the data they provided documented reductions in the costs of trade. These results were made public on the Internet.

Training provided for small and medium-size enterprises. Training was needed, especially for small and medium-size enterprises engaged in regional trade and for owner-operators in the transport sector. Training began with newly prepared materials on business ethics, corruption, international delivery terms, commercial transaction documents, trade payment methods, transport operations, and customs transit procedures. This was followed by training of trainers. By the end of the second year, 169 seminars had been provided for 3,142 participants at 85 locations. Certification programs were provided for road transport operators and freight forwarders. TTFSE's distance learning methodology is already being replicated to provide training in supply chain management in Latin America.

Problems Encountered

Customs staff were slow to give up 100 percent inspections of containers and were reluctant to shift to a more effective use of risk management and greater selectivity in inspections.

- Cooperation among border-crossing agencies, both locally and nationally, needs improvement.
- The turnover of border-crossing agency staff has been excessively high, especially within customs administration. This has impeded ownership of the reform process.
- Progress is just beginning in the fight against smuggling and corruption. The take-off now needs reinforcement.
- The effectiveness of liaison among TTFSE national coordinators varies considerably from country to country. Support needs to be strengthened at the highest levels of government.

Factors for Success

A political economy favorable to change. The main obstacle to reform is the interest of certain key stakeholders in keeping things as they are. This is especially true where high-value financial transactions are involved, as is the case with customs operations. Countering such resistance requires commitment that is built through participatory processes, consensus, and transparency. TTFSE has shown that the gains through reform are well worth the effort.

Significantly, revenue collection by customs is the major single source of revenue for many governments in the region. So, economic gains through sectoral reform can produce dramatic results – ranging from 25 to 70 percent of total government revenues across the TTFSE countries. Greater flow and value of trade yields a return that is reflected in governments' budgets. It is clear that government agencies stood to benefit directly. As a result, political interest in the TTFSE reforms was widespread.

Commitment to the TTFSE program also drew upon increasing concern among countries to fight corruption. Each country had a national anticorruption program, and nearly every critic considered customs officials to be major offenders. The negative scores from surveys conducted by agencies such as Transparency International publicly underscored the urgency of reform. The need to change these external perceptions was linked to the rationale for reform. It emerged as a key element in the dialogue associated with the client readiness survey that was carried out in program design. The project teams adopted a consultative approach that was sensitive to the internal dynamics of the local political systems. Recurrent visits helped to reinforce political commitment and the necessary consensus in support of reform.

Anticorruption programs and reforms within customs had already been initiated by donors and other external institutions. These reinforced policy makers'



commitment to TTFSE reform. Complementary activities included EU support and regional programs such as the anticrime center in Romania operated by the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI).

Institutional innovation, such as surveys geared toward results. The surveys of users of border control services, which were conducted in conjunction with the preparation of the TTFSE projects, indicated seriously deficient institutional communication and collaboration. Border control agencies did not communicate very well, at crossing points, or with their respective headquarters. Similarly, the headquarters of the border control agencies did not communicate well with each other, or with neighboring counterpart agencies. Because regional reform demanded cooperation at all levels, especially to get rid of duplicative and conflicting procedures, the design of TTFSE introduced institutional mechanisms for communication and cooperation.

Local project teams, including representatives from the control agencies, were created at the border-crossing points of pilot sites. The local teams were tasked with collecting the data to monitor the performance indicators. They analyzed the data on operational and procedural reforms. A team of customs specialists, deployed and financed by parallel grants from the United States, provided specialized technical guidance for the local project teams.

The TTFSE national coordinator designated a high-level government official to speak on behalf of border control agencies and to facilitate interagency liaison. The regional steering committee, another innovative institutional mechanism, provided a new forum for cross-border consultation, dialogue, and information sharing.

Learning and Experimentation. Learning was facilitated by the staggered development of projects as the program evolved, creating an experience of “several generations.” Meanwhile, continuity was sustained among the core TTFSE team that prepared and supervised all projects.

At the outset, the high costs and uncertainties over regional trade were sufficient to justify fast-tracking in preparing TTFSE. The audits of client readiness, however, suggested that fast-tracking would work against consensus building. Time was needed to generate political commitment, so the preparation team slowed its pace accordingly. Institutional lags among user groups also constrained the pace of implementation. Increasing awareness of the needs of users resulted in scaling up and replication of consultative methods in the TTFSE approach. To achieve results, it often makes

sense to slow down preparation, and focus instead on longer-term consensus building.

Initially, the proposed reforms were broad and comprehensive. They reflected the theoretical ideal espoused by reform specialists. Though desirable in principle, this overly broad agenda would have overstressed local systems in light of the often turbulent political and economic changes under way in the region. Institutional audits signaled that the targets for reform needed to be narrowed. TTFSE’s launch workshop reconfirmed the need for phasing in the process and scaling up once primary objectives were met. The first step was adoption of computer applications to make processes transparent and more efficient, as well as making data readily available at the pilot sites. The quantitative monitoring of the pilot site data facilitated the qualitative, recurrent rethinking of the reform process. Thus, the stage was set for the identification of new targets for action.

Forging a better partnership between the public and private sector required more than accessible performance data. General information was needed on trade and border-crossing requirements. The new regional Web site provided such information and encouraged dialogue on how to reduce trade constraints.

TTFSE was focused largely on a single mode – road transport. As implementation progressed, the potential benefits from a multimodal approach began to outweigh the single-mode approach. In future replication, a multimodal approach to pilot site selection is likely.

To increase individual skills and institutional capacity, the TTFSE program consciously sought out learning opportunities. This was especially important for the small- and medium-size enterprises that were often located outside cities. Because these enterprises had limited access to traditional classroom training, a distance learning program was developed with the Global Facilitation Partnership Distance Learning Program at the World Bank. This included Internet-accessible learning parallel to classroom instruction, with both tracks leading to professional certification. The distance learning program includes study guides, reference materials, links to mentoring services as well as to publications and media presentations. Each country facilitates the program through the services of local partners such as national road transport associations. As the training programs move toward full implementation, businesses can participate at their own pace. Certification is to be granted by national and international professional organizations such as the International Road Transport Union. Program content is available for rollout in other countries.



The Role of Key External Catalysts

What initiatives, factors, and agents helped to trigger support for the reform agenda and new institutional mechanisms that TTFSE represents?

At the top of the list is the importance that the region accorded to European Union accession. The EU had developed a checklist of specific customs reforms. TTFSE provided support for these prescribed changes, referred to as “blueprints,” as well as harmonization with EU standards. Acceptance of EU guideline reforms, regional collaboration, and results achievement had high rates of return and served as strong incentives throughout the region.

The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) includes the eight countries in the TTFSE program as well as four significant trading partners: Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey. Established with strong U.S. and EU support in December 1996, SECI promoted economic and environmental cooperation focused on efficient transit and the combating of corruption and smuggling. The congruence of SECI and TTFSE objectives created diplomatic synergy, which benefited TTFSE, including funds and technical assistance from the United States. SECI was especially interested in assisting the evolution of pro-committees to facilitate trade and transport through dialogue between the public and private sectors.

As a follow-up to building regional stability, foreign ministers and representatives of international organizations, institutions, and other regional initiatives adopted a pact for southeastern Europe at a special meeting in Cologne, Germany, in 1999. The stability pact adopted a comprehensive, coordinated, strategic approach to regional development, using preventative diplomacy to replace crisis management as the prevailing mode. TTFSE, which focused on improving the investment climate, was the first regional program to fit within the framework of the stability pact.

Another incentive for reform was provided by financial support from international donors. In addition to World Bank support, this included parallel grant funding from the United States and trust fund support from Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Norway.

Finally, the private sector began to coalesce as a force with considerable potential to exercise power and became a factor with which governments had to contend. Recognition of this fact forced policy makers to take the concerns of users and beneficiaries into consideration when planning.

Lessons Learned

Initial reform efforts must be clearly and tightly focused. Although a “comprehensive approach” may maximize impact in theory, at the outset it is better to focus on well-defined smaller targets. It is more important to achieve clear success with direct, demonstrable impact on users. Limiting the initial focus of reform to pilot sites therefore made sense.

An organizational culture supportive of reform is the basis for change. Resistance to change is universal, and fast-paced change is often self-defeating within stressed systems such as the transitional economies of Eastern Europe. TTFSE introduced relatively modest innovations – new data systems and simplified procedures. Yet these were important because they produced tangible results which helped persuade customs agencies of the benefits from broader change. This approach proved far more effective than overly broad, accusatory anticorruption programs. Positive experience helped customs agencies to internalize the values associated with transparency and accountability.

Measuring the effect of the project on users through performance indicators is vital to successful monitoring and implementation. Monitoring is a process. Care must first be taken to identify and properly define project indicators. Then a proper baseline is needed, with mechanisms to collect information. Quantitative data then supplements user feedback. The tracking of results is strengthened when the information provided by user surveys and monitoring can be mutually validated at pilot sites. Once the performance indicators are operational, they can support issue analysis and be used for cross-national comparisons, which serve as a platform for “peer group pressure” on customs administration managers. Because clients generally overestimate their initial performance and the ease of reform, solid project indicators are vital for successful monitoring and implementation. Once developed, they infuse realism and help to pinpoint areas needing ongoing policy and procedural reform.

Short-term progress and long-term sustainability both depend on the client agency “owning” the reform process. The World Bank team that appraised the TTFSE project worked closely with local managers to lay the groundwork for eventual ownership. This was not a one-time process. It took place in mission after mission. The process was complicated by “drift” in commitment over time and frequent personnel changes at the upper and middle levels.



Linkages matter almost as much as the institutions themselves. Mechanisms that link national organizations create a cornerstone for institutional capacity. TTFSE facilitated communication between the pilot sites and headquarters. Then it helped border control agencies to communicate more effectively among themselves, both locally and nationally. Developing interagency coordination and streamlining the full border-crossing cycle required inter-ministerial collaboration, which only succeeds with high-level political commitment and cooperation.

The private sector is a necessary partner in the reform process. Throughout the history of TTFSE, the private sector has served as a necessary source of continuous pressure, reinforcing government commitment to the reform process both nationally and regionally. Because the private sector views itself as a beneficiary of TTFSE, it has been willing to collaborate and bear costs, including future monitoring.

The subtle behavior of the local political systems – sometimes leading to changes of government – was often difficult to anticipate, interpret, and respond to. Political factors caused frequent delays in project implementation. Local staff at in-country offices were indispensable for understanding the shifts, whether ripples or cataclysms.

Broader Applicability: Spreading Results to Other Countries

A scalable model for reform of trade and transport facilitation has been developed at pilot sites in Southeast Europe. Lessons learned and best practices not only have informed project evolution at the TTFSE pilot sites, but also are being applied elsewhere. In Romania and Bulgaria, for example, high levels of client ownership have resulted in lessons learned at the pilot sites being replicated and extended to other national border crossings.

The TTFSE focus on policy dialogue, performance indicators, and public-private partnership is highly applicable to reform efforts emerging outside the region – for example in Armenia and Georgia. Performance indicators are also being applied in two very different settings – the Russian Federation Customs Modernization Project and the Afghan Emergency Customs Project. A similar approach to policy dialogue is guiding trade and transport facilitation discussions in Central Asia.

To launch and implement a trade facilitation program – in any country or region – the following steps and actions are needed:

- Preliminary identification of what needs to be changed – What are the issues?

- Survey of the geographic area in which regional collaboration will take place.
- Country analysis – This includes identification of major constraints, institutional assessments, specific studies, and stakeholder analyses.
- Mechanisms for interaction – These include identification of national and regional champions and task forces in areas such as legal change, procedures and operations, and interagency collaboration.
- A forum for identifying key issues – In the case of TTFSE, this included national “pro-committees” and a regional steering committee.
- Development of an action plan or a strategic implementation plan.
- Setting the action plan within a project context with donor or local financing.
- Identification of performance indicators.
- Monitoring and evaluation that feeds back into the ongoing process of policy reform.

Summary: How TTFSE Embodies the MfDR Principles

1. At all phases – from strategic planning through implementation to completion and beyond – focus the dialogue on results for partner countries, development agencies, and other stakeholders.

- Program design paid close attention to results across a region of, first six and then eight countries.
- Dialogue began with the ministries of finance and the customs administration agencies in respective countries.
- Key participants were the transportation industry (producers and shippers) and the public, who depend on the smooth flow of goods across borders.

2. Align actual programming, monitoring, and evaluation activities with the agreed expected results.

- The program was carefully planned to emphasize customs administration.
- Reforms needed to occur before infrastructure investments could be made.
- The TTFSE Manual was developed with a full set of performance indicators. These were put in place in all eight countries to flag what needed to be monitored and accomplished.

3. Keep the results reporting system as simple, cost-effective, and user-friendly as possible.

- The results reporting system was comprehensive, though not overly complex.



- The program implementation units in each country found the performance indicators to be suitable, and the progress reporting systems were considered practical.
- Timely reports showed clear evidence of progress at the country level.

4. Manage for, not by, results, by arranging resources to achieve outcomes.

- This program has made substantial impact through more-efficient trade flow, reduced waiting time at borders, and less corruption.
- The end goal was formulated in terms of behavioral change in customs administration – and this happened.

5 Use results information for management learning and decision making, as well as for reporting and accountability.

- TTFSE has generated critical information for managers of customs administrations to improve their operations.
- Data analysis has helped to identify border bottlenecks, reducing waiting times and providing practical information to users – for example, which border crossings have shorter lines at what times.
- The TTFSE program has also helped decision makers in ministries of finance to review budget requests in light of the efficiencies and needs of current operations. Results data helps them to allocate based on identified need rather than historical precedent.

References

An overview of results under TTFSE is found in “Progress Report 2002,” “Progress Report 2003,” and in subsequent reports. These and other project-related documents are continuously updated and made available on the TTFSE Web site:

<http://www.seerecon.org/RegionalInitiatives/TTFSE/>

A regional Web site, including trade facilitation information provided by national partners in each TTFSE country, is found at: <http://www.TTFSE.org>

A similar Web site for the Caucasus is found at: <http://www.TTFSC.org>

Information on the Global Facilitation Partnership and the Distance Learning Initiative can be found at <http://www.gfp-dli.org> and <http://www.gfptt.org>

Additional information on trade facilitation and transport is found on the ECSIE Transport Library Web site at:

<http://www.worldbank.org/ECA/Transport/>

See also the trade facilitation and logistic section on the World Bank Trade Web site at:

<http://www.worldbank.org/WBsite/external/topics/trade> and <http://www.guam.org>

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