

Uganda: Evolution and Alignment of an Orientation to Results

Authors:

Peter M. Ssentongo, Assistant Commissioner for Coordination and Monitoring, Government of Uganda

Rema Nair Balasundaram, Consultant, Operational Policy and Country Services, World Bank

Executive Summary

Policy frameworks and reforms formulated by the Government of Uganda since the mid-1980s set Uganda apart as a forerunner and leader in the race toward development effectiveness and an early alignment toward results in the Sub-Saharan African Region. This brief looks at the evolution of alignment to results in the context of poverty programs and sectors, and draws lessons and conclusions on where Uganda is today.

Introduction

Uganda gained independence in 1962, and the new Government of the National Resistance Movement led by His Excellency President Museveni took over in 1986. At this time much of the infrastructure was destroyed and GDP per capita was 40 percent lower than in 1971.²⁹ The government worked to prioritize the restoration of peace and economic stability and set in place a continuing and evolving policy framework³⁰, built around a sustained process of reform and rehabilitation. Uganda's alignment to results commenced in the late 1980s, when a series of increasingly country-owned economic reforms was put in place. These reforms included:

- an Economic Recovery Program in 1987,
- a liberalization of the foreign exchange system,
- the enactment of a decentralization initiative in 1987,
- a Local Government Act established in 1997,
- a civil service reform that worked toward reducing the size of the civil service and reorienting it toward a Results Oriented Management System, and
- the Declaration of Universal Primary Education in 1997.

In 1995, Uganda embarked on a participatory process to formulate a poverty-focused, long-term holistic development framework to reduce poverty in all its dimensions. The process culminated in the formulation of the 1997 *Poverty Eradication Action Plan* (PEAP).

The establishment of the Poverty Action Fund in 1998 guided social development for the poor, and this was

followed by the subsequent revision and adoption of the PEAP as the Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2000. Uganda was the first country in the Sub-Saharan Africa Region to present a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to the Boards of the Bank and IMF in May 2000. A summary of the government's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), a home-grown medium-term development plan, was used for this purpose since the objectives and content of the PRSP and PEAP were consistent. The PEAP became the primary framework for planning, and was implemented through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, a rolling three-year plan that has guided the annual budget cycle since 1992.³¹ Uganda became the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to qualify for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Uganda has just published a third version of the PEAP (2004) which goes beyond the original four social sectors in focus, to emphasize the performance of the private sector, civil society organizations, and the public sector in the delivery of development results. PEAP 2004 articulates the expected development results in a more coherent manner in the PEAP results and policy matrix.

Country Context

Over the last 19 years, the government has implemented policies geared toward eradicating poverty among its people. These policies led to a substantial reduction in poverty levels from 56 percent in 1992 to 38 percent in 2003. The country's GDP per-capita is about US\$250; life expectancy at birth is 47.3 years; adult literacy (ages 15 and above) is 68.9 percent; and Uganda ranks 144 out of 175 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) – (UNDP, 2003).

²⁹ Coordination and Sector Support, IOB Netherlands, 2003.

³⁰ Uganda Country Case study, OECD DAC, October, 2002.

³¹ Coordination and Sector Support, IOB, Netherlands, 2003.



The PEAP framework for addressing the key poverty challenges was developed and launched in 1997. During the process of implementation, new challenges arose, and this led the government to work toward the first revision of the PEAP in 2000.³² By this time Uganda had succeeded in reversing massive capital flight, establishing macroeconomic stability, rebuilding key public institutions, and revitalizing local civic participation. Although Uganda's performance at the macroeconomic level had been impressive, the transition from a postconflict "bounce-back" in growth to a sustained rapid expansion had been elusive, and Uganda's social indicators in 2000 were still below Sub-Saharan African country averages.

Early Efforts to Promote Alignment around Results

The process of alignment to results and poverty reduction strategies based on country needs commenced in the mid-1990s. The July 1995 Consultative Group Meeting discussed a Poverty Update on Uganda, which resulted in members requesting a separate meeting to discuss the issues of poverty in Uganda. Addressed by President Museveni and with the assistance of the Netherlands government, donors, the Government of Uganda, and civil society members met in late 1995 to develop a strategy to ensure that economic growth had a more effective impact on poverty. This resulted in the establishment of a national Task Force on Poverty Eradication comprising government officials, NGOs in Uganda, and donors. The Task Force completed a strategy paper by the middle of 1996 which became a key document to the fiscal year 1996/97 budget, and was subsequently discussed at a special 1996 Consultative Group discussion. This culminated in 1997 in the formulation of the PEAP, a comprehensive national planning framework for reducing poverty that included: universal primary education, primary health care, water, sanitation, agricultural extension, and rural roads. In order to operationalize the PEAP, detailed plans of action and goals for sectors were developed in the Education Sector Investment Plan, the Health Sector Strategic Plan, the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture, the Social Development Sector Strategic Plan, and the Road Sector Development Plan.³³

³² Republic of Uganda, PEAP and Joint Staff Assessment, World Bank, IMF

³³ Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth, country case study Uganda, October 2004

Evolution of the Alignment to Results in Poverty Reduction Strategies and in Sectors

Policy frameworks and reforms set in place by the government from the early 1990s led to a sustained alignment toward results in sectors as well as poverty work in the country. By the year 2000, Uganda had gained experience in analytical work, including a series of household surveys, the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP), and in designing and implementing PEAP I. This culminated in the publication of the second Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP II), a medium-term strategy organized around four "pillars" with the objectives to "create an enabling environment for economic growth and structural transformation (Pillar 1); ensure good governance and security (Pillar 2); directly increase the ability of the poor to raise their incomes through rural development and expansion of non-farm activities (Pillar 3); and directly increase the quality of life of the poor through the provision of primary education, health care, and water and sanitation services (Pillar 4)".³⁴

In 2001, the World Bank carried out a study of M&E arrangements and developments in Uganda. In 2002, a follow-up study reviewed the role of monitoring and evaluation in three priority sectors (health, education, and water) and reflected the burden of producing information in these sectors. The challenges included: limited flow of relevant information, weak M&E coordination arrangements, inadequate performance-based public management culture, and gaps in information and underused information.

In response to the M&E challenges identified, the government commenced the formulation of a National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES). In 2003, the Cabinet of the Government of Uganda approved a coordination framework³⁵ to

³⁴ PRSC (1-3) Implementation Completion Report, World Bank, 2005.

³⁵ This coordination framework is composed of a four-tier coordination mechanism, namely: (a) Cabinet Sub Committee on Policy Coordination (CCPC) comprising Ministers of coordinating Ministries under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister; (b) Implementation Coordination Steering Committee (ICSC) composed of all the Permanent Secretaries under the chairmanship of the Head of Public Service/Secretary to Cabinet; (c) Technical Implementation Coordination Committee (TICC), a multisectoral technical committee to be chaired by the Permanent Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister; and (d) Sector Working Groups that bring together all sectoral stakeholders to discuss sectoral



make sure that all government programs worked in a rational and synchronized manner. This coordination framework is supported by an integrated monitoring, evaluation and information management system. This unique process, formulated as NIMES, represents an integration of all efforts aimed at data collection and information gathering and dissemination with respect to the delivery of the government's intended goals and policy objectives, as laid out in the PEAP and other national policy frameworks.


In January 2004, a task force headed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) undertook consultations to look more closely at information management systems at local and national levels. The review recommended the establishment of an appropriate institutional framework that would enhance coordination of M&E systems and processes in the government.

In March 2004, a workshop was held to present the findings of the earlier studies. Relevant stakeholders from various government departments, development partners, and civil society organizations were brought together to give their views on the proposed NIMES draft, and also to map the way forward. It was clear, however, that while there was a common understanding of the problems being faced with monitoring and evaluation at a national level, the role of NIMES as a potential solution to these problems was not clearly understood. The PEAP 2004 articulates the NIMES as the framework for monitoring and evaluating its performance. Through the NIMES, the challenges that were identified would be addressed. The question being addressed by NIMES is whether public sector policy and program implementation is efficient and effective in delivering development results. Therefore, in terms of strategic objectives, the NIMES is expected to ensure: (a) the efficient and effective implementation of government policies and programs; (b) that policy decision makers articulate their information needs adequately and with clarity; (c) that the systems generate and supply data and information in the appropriate frequency to facilitate key stakeholder decisions; and (d) that the capacity to measure and articulate public sector performance is built in a manner that helps to provide evidence for this performance.

Ongoing Efforts to Enhance the Results Orientation of Development Effectiveness in Uganda

Within the NIMES framework, M&E arrangements are conceived as a results-oriented process of tracking progress within the PEAP as a whole, and are aimed in particular at facilitating effective coordination across government. In this respect, the entry point for PEAP M&E is to capture successes and constraints in implementing the reform intentions and in attaining the development goals that have been expressed in the PEAP *Policy and Results Matrix*. In line with good practice principles of management for development results and aid effectiveness, Uganda's M&E is formulated to address output, outcome and impact levels – rather than mere tabulation of inputs and activities.

While the PEAP M&E plan provides an overall structure of arrangements that has implications for data collection and management at all levels of government, it does not seek to specify all those M&E activities that ultimately remain necessary for daily operational management within individual institutions. The PEAP M&E plan is built around the PEAP Policy and Results Matrix which was designed to be a strong instrument for coordinating and monitoring government institutions to deliver on policy actions and expected results. The PEAP Policy and Results Matrix³⁶ is organized as a hierarchy of goals as depicted in the left-hand box of the scheme provided below:



efforts in implementation of sector activities. This mechanism facilitates intra-sectoral coordination for the realization of sector targets and goals.

³⁶ The Matrix is uploaded on www.nimes.go.ug



Specific planned reforms (policy actions) are organized around the five PEAP pillars and have been identified for each of the four years spanned by the current PEAP. The logic of change is designed so that a set of policy actions can positively influence an outcome, while, in turn, improvement in a given set of outcomes is part of what characterizes attainment of a given strategic objective. Cutting across individual PEAP pillars and associated outcomes is the expectation of improvement pertaining to a small set of *Key Results Areas* reflecting income, poverty, inequality, human development and growth.

For each of the Key Results Areas and outcomes, one or more indicators have been identified and targets established – the monitoring of which will reveal success or failure. Data on these indicators come from different sources, but the established schedule of Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) surveys affords an opportunity for reporting on most. The profiling of the PEAP outcome indicators, with a view to ensuring that their M&E outputs will feed easily into key policy decision-making processes of government in the various sectors, has also been finalized. The profile of outcome indicators is presented in accordance with each strategic objective and pillar. It attempts to be precise in indicator definitions, indicator baseline information and targets, sources of data on indicators, frequency of data collection, and reporting. The profile shows that while some indicators are precisely defined and measurable, others may not be precisely defined and therefore alternative indicators have been proposed as second generation indicators.

At the level of policy actions, progress is validated through observing the implementation of outlined reforms. Some of the policy actions have been expressed in a manner that allows for quantitative observation, although most reflect institutional changes that need to be subjected to more qualitative judgment and evaluative processes.

The continuous monitoring of outcome and key results area indicators, together with observation of implementation of planned policy actions (to be captured in a schedule of periodic progress reporting), represents the raw data for the PEAP review process. Naturally, progress reporting will, in addition to factual description of indicator and policy action status, also need to comprise a narrative discussion of constraints encountered and challenges emerging.

The PEAP M&E Plan thus uses five main types and sources of data:

- UBOS censuses and sample surveys, related to progress toward targets established for PEAP outcomes and strategic objectives
- Research and evaluation work done by various stakeholders – both government and non-government actors
- Administrative data, collected through Ministerial, Departmental and Agency (MDA) management information systems, reflecting allocation and utilization of financial resources, service delivery and, in some cases, progress toward PEAP outcome targets
- Self-reported qualitative data on implementation of PEAP policy actions, constraints encountered, and challenges emerging
- Civil society reports on the performance of government policy, programs, and projects across the country. This source will be very useful in enriching the government's own sources of information on performance of government policies, programs and projects. It will also be useful as one of the main channels of beneficiary assessments of public service delivery.

In order to facilitate coordination of PEAP M&E, the OPM NIMES Secretariat has established a centralized PEAP information management system, comprising the PEAP Policy and Results Matrix itself; the associated indicators, including details on the sources, methods and responsibilities for indicator data collection; as well as the tables that are to be used to capture future progress reporting against the PEAP.

To enhance transparency and facilitate discussions and progress reporting, it is envisaged that the PEAP Policy and Results Matrix, together with the associated M&E framework, will be kept in the public domain by posting on NIMES' Web site.³⁷

A PEAP review cycle has been formulated as both an annual and a four-year exercise. The overall PEAP directions, including the Pillar organization and the cross-cutting Key Results Areas (with their associated indicators), will remain in place for the entire PEAP cycle, while the individual outcomes and policy actions will be subject to refinement and amendment on an annual basis. The product of the annual review cycle will be a revised PEAP Policy and Results Matrix, while the product of the four-year review cycle will be a new version of the PEAP as a whole.

After the annual review exercise, the PEAP Annual Report, a government-owned document, will be translated into the "National Policy and Program Performance Status Report" that is presented by the Hon. Prime Minister to Cabinet. Other regular reports produced by government, which will be folded into the PEAP reporting and review framework, include:

³⁷ www.nimes.go.ug



- The Poverty Status Report, which is produced every two years by the MFPED
- Sectoral Joint Review Reports every six months
- Participatory Poverty Assessment Reports
- Statistical Survey Reports by UBOS
- Budget Framework Paper, annual
- Background to the Budget document by MFPED, annually.

In terms of alignment with both government and donor partners' decision-making cycles and requirements, the PEAP review process will be formulated as an evolving mechanism – therefore, current plans for the annual and four-year time frame are tentative.

The Experience of Alignment to Results in the Sectors

Uganda's experience of alignment to results in the sectors is also driven by policy and reform frameworks that were put in place by the government over a period of time.

The introduction of the Universal Primary Education Program in 1997 resulted in a dramatic increase in primary school enrolments from 3.1 million children in 1996 to 6.6 million by 2000, with virtual equity between boys and girls. However, educational quality and performance could not keep up with enrolment, in part due to various factors, including: the limits on how quickly new teachers could be trained (still averaging some 63 pupils per teacher in 2000, although down from 100:1 in 1997), inadequate number of classrooms (average of 121 students per classroom in 1999), and insufficient teaching materials (average of 6.7 students per textbook in core subjects). Poor educational quality was also evident in low student test scores and high drop-out rates. Enrolments at the secondary level continued to be low, with fewer than 20 percent of school-aged children entering high school, and a significant proportion of these (63 percent) coming from the wealthiest 20 percent of households, where girls remained underrepresented. One of the perennial problems plaguing Uganda's education system had been the weakness and corruption in the district educational system responsible for the transfer of funds. By 2000, the government had made significant improvements, increasing the proportion of funds reaching schools from 20 percent in 1995 to over 90 percent.³⁸ (A more detailed account of the experience in the education sector is provided in the synthesis

³⁸ Much of this section has been taken from the World Bank, ICR Report, PRSC (1-3), 2005.

from the Netherlands Joint Evaluation of the Education Sector country case study.³⁹)

Alignment to Results in the Education Sector

The government targeted the reform and strengthening of basic education in its policy documentation in the late 1980s. The World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand (March 5-9, 1990) led to the formulation of the Government White Paper (Ministry of Education and Sports, MOES, 1992), an enhanced dialogue with individual external support agencies, and to increased donor coordination by the mid-1990s. Universal Primary Education was announced in 1996 and followed by the Education Strategic Investment Plan (ESIP) in 1997. By 2002, virtually all external donor support was aligned within the framework of the ESIP, with a significant number of donors providing assistance through budget support mechanisms rather than individual projects. The evolution of the early ideas that led to the ESIP was the result of a dialogue between the Government of Uganda and donors, led on the external side by the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID). This dialogue resulted in Uganda becoming one of the first and most successful education SWAPs.

Preliminary plans for developing an education SWAP in Uganda seem to have emerged in 1996 during a World Bank study tour to Korea that involved a number of senior MOES officials. DFID provided some initial technical assistance to get the process started in the MOES, and the ESIP emerged in 1997. The initial group of supporting agencies was relatively small: DFID, Ireland, Netherlands, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), along with the European Commission (EC) and the World Bank, who were also the initial providers of budget support. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) joined a little later. Other agencies also brought their legacy projects under the ESIP umbrella for purposes of strategic planning and monitoring. In parallel to these efforts, there was a strong, coordinated, external agency consultation at a much broader multisectoral level that led to the development of the CDF and the PEAP.

As coordinated policy dialogues intensified, it was clear to the donors and the government that a more structured process was needed. This resulted in the negotiation of a formal Memorandum of Agreement, between the government and the donors, on govern-

³⁹ Country Study Report Uganda, Joint Evaluation of External Support to Basic Education in Developing Countries, October, 2003.



ment-agency dialogue, cooperation, coordination and harmonization. The external support agencies formed the Education Funding Agencies Group (EFAG), which operates under an agreement between the funding agencies. In 1999, the government and participating funding agencies formed the Education Sector Consultative Committee (ESCC) in the MOES to handle government-agency dialogue, cooperation, coordination and harmonization. In meetings with various agencies, however, it became clear that these arrangements were seen from a variety of perspectives.

The EFAG supports and works with the government in management of the review process. Accountability requirements of external support agencies that provide budget support are based on a set of negotiated undertakings which are reviewed in each Education Sector Review (ESR) meeting and that provide the triggers for the release of the following tranche of external funding, the study noted. Agency representatives noted that earlier, accountability was measured in terms of 57 distinct undertakings. As the ESR process evolved, this has been brought down to less than 10 carefully nuanced undertakings.⁴⁰ Joint commitments of the government and the EFAG involve other ministries, particularly the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and Sports.

Alignment to Results in the other Sectors

The Government of Uganda published a National Water Policy in 1999, focused on community driven demand in rural areas, along with improved district management and private sector involvement. In urban areas, the policy emphasized private sector participation to commercialize and improve the efficiency of the sector, professionalize the public management of the sector, and introduce an independent regulatory system. The rural water and sanitation facilities PRSC components were aimed at increasing rural access to safe water and sanitation from 55 percent in 2000 to 65 percent by April 2005, at an average investment of US\$50 per capita. Functionality of these facilities was to be maintained at a minimum of 80 percent, and the average time spent fetching water reduced to less than 30 minutes.⁴¹

The Ministry of Health formulated its first draft Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) in 1999. It was implemented through a SWAp. The HSSP emphasizes the delivery of a minimum health care package of cost

effective interventions, and is implemented under a SWAp involving semiannual joint sector reviews that monitor progress, identify and address constraints, and establish targets.

The implementation of HSSP is monitored against 20 key health indicators. Alignment of the PRSC in this sector provides an interesting comparison as well – PRSC components focus on rationalizing the financing of health care by channeling donor financing through the government budget in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of health care spending.

Specific components addressed the actions needed to strengthen logistics and management of drugs and medical supplies through the implementation of a National Drug Policy and Pharmaceutical Strategic Plan (based on tracking studies that identified key ways of improving drug management and supply).

Other supportive measures included the establishment of a fund to provide credit to districts to procure drugs, consolidation of the health sector payroll under the PHC conditional grant, and formation of an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate actions relevant for the training of health care staff (by both public and privately run health schools) within a new human resource development policy for the health sector.

Finally, PRSC health components focused on the need to improve Uganda's rundown health infrastructure through the implementation of a National Health Infrastructure Development and Maintenance Plan, which aims to rationalize the distribution of health facilities, rehabilitate existing structures, and speed the construction of facilities to underserved areas through the use of minimum new construction standards and improved flow of funds for construction and maintenance. These components were included to: help raise to 47 percent the proportion of health facilities staffed by qualified health workers, increase the DPT3 vaccination coverage for infants from 63 percent in 2000 to 75 percent by 2003/4; increase the utilization of outpatient facilities from 0.40 per capita in 2000 to 0.65 per capita in 2003/4; reduce the adult HIV prevalence from 6.5 percent in 2000 to 5 percent in 2003/4; ensure that 28 percent of deliveries are assisted by trained health workers (up from 21 percent in year 2000); and reduce the rates of infant and maternal mortality.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ PRSC 1-3, Implementation Completion Report, World Bank, 2005.

⁴² Ibid.



Lessons for the Development of a Harmonized M&E Framework for the Poverty Reduction Support Program

Despite the progress Uganda has made over the past few decades in its efforts to enhance development effectiveness and work toward a broad results-oriented framework in its portfolio of programs, the challenge for Uganda today is to continue the same momentum of policy formulation and implementation in its current programmatic environment. The following lessons have been found to be crucial as Uganda continues to establish enhanced results-based decision making processes.

1. Consultation and Consensus Building

In Uganda, the biggest challenge to building a results-based M&E system, encouraging evidence-based decision making, and harmonization of M&E systems in the public service system has been the bureaucracy. A bureaucratic culture that hides around mandates (political basis of the public service system) remains a major impediment in the country. There is therefore a need to understand the public sector system as a whole, identify allies, and start getting quick wins that will convince the skeptics and show the added value and progress toward achieving results.

2. Political Leadership and Commitment

In Uganda, political leadership and commitment has been a difficult ingredient of the process to come by. Politicians have not yet seen the opportunities offered by a responsive and results-oriented public service system. It is true that the necessary institutions of accountability and legislation on procurement and financial management are in place, but a good deal more needs to be done at the bureaucratic level of the results chain. Putting in place policies and processes that make public sector managers accountable for strategic outcomes that accrue to the citizens is critical.

It is not a measure of a good orientation to results to spend the entire fiscal year budget and then, at the end, account only for the utilization of money through workshop reports or school buildings – this may benefit institutional actions, but does not have any impact on the quality of life of the target population. Political commitment calls for questioning the actions of bureaucrats, to ensure that policy outcomes are obtained and that bureaucrats account for such outcomes. Committing to do this at Cabinet level would make a difference in the long run.

Citizens should be empowered to question political decisions and demand quality goods and services from government. Politicians should be challenged to produce evidence rather than a “gut feeling” – as eventu-

ally this will encourage politicians to make decisions based on evidence. It is vital that both political and bureaucratic decision makers are mindful of making suboptimal decisions due to lack of evidence. Evidence is measurable and must be recorded in an adequate manner.

3. Diagnosis and Analysis of the Problem

Identification and provision of a home-grown solution to decision making is quite critical in the results orientation process. In the case of Uganda, analyzing the government as a single system with its challenges of information management,⁴³ flow,⁴⁴ infrastructure,⁴⁵ and use⁴⁶ helped us to provide a value-added solution. The process, however, has been painfully slow and therefore requires effective consultation and consensus building. This can be one of the most sustainable ways of developing and sustaining a results-oriented M&E system at the national level.

4. A Highly Technology Driven M&E System is no Solution

Although it may be easy to generate integration through fixing the MIS database, or by allowing the Education MIS to integrate with the Health MIS or any other MISs, technological fixing is not always the solution for the simple reason that it is the PEOPLE and processes that matter first before technology. Establishing an institutional framework of harmonization and integration with better monitoring and evaluation processes, before installing technological backups, is as necessary as ensuring that stakeholders involved appreciate the purpose or need of an evidence-based, decision-making framework and why it is being established.

5. Communication is Crucial

In Uganda, as in many countries in Africa, there has been a tendency to present the concepts of results orientation and M&E in a somewhat complex and technical manner, rather than build them around principles

⁴³ Information Management includes primary production of information, process, storage, and packing in a manner that will ensure adequate information flow.

⁴⁴ Information Flow involves reporting, sharing, and feedback of information.

⁴⁵ Information Infrastructure involves not only computer hardware, but also the rules and regulations that govern the management, flow, and use of information, concepts and definitions, and their combination with human resource, etc.

⁴⁶ Information Use means more than producing technical reports; it implies use of evidence to make public sector decisions.



of public sector management. Results orientation must go beyond the technical requirements of programs. It must also be presented with evidence from programs in all communication at the national and local levels.

The aim of the government should be to develop a results-based culture in the public and private sector environments, with the recognition that within the public sector system there will be varied levels of understanding of the operational approach, concept and processes of results and M&E as a whole. There will be varied levels of adoption and adaptation of the concept and processes of M&E, but the framework of adoption and adaptation must be well communicated to all stakeholders.

The real challenge is that M&E was first developed for the purpose of project and program level management. Bureaucrats and political decision makers in the public sector were, for a long time, comfortable with economic models that often rotated around a good understanding of the macroeconomics of a country, financial accountability of public expenditures, and a few rural thumbnail development indicators often driven from development partner analysis of government performance. Understanding causality and communicating evidence in terms of real benefits to target groups is a relatively new notion in the public sector in the region. Economic research and policy analysis using economic models were the tools for macro-level evaluation of public sector performance toward social benefits.

Information needs to be harnessed, and evidence well communicated, in order to ensure that there is a causal linkage of public sector resource management and the benefits that accrue to the citizens of Uganda. Communication becomes part of the results process and enables stakeholders to understand and generate agreement on what exactly needs to be achieved in a strategic manner. In Uganda, a NIMES brochure has been formulated to explain in a much simpler form to all stakeholders the need for harmonization and other aspects of functioning. A Web site dedicated to providing M&E information to stakeholders has also been launched (see: www.nimes.go.ug). A communication strategy that will allow for engagement with public sector management and politicians at all levels of government has also been formulated.

The principle of communicating evidence is designed on the principle that the citizens of Uganda will be at the forefront of public sector decision making. Measurement, monitoring, and management of results are built on a shared strategic understanding of several questions, and these may include: What are we trying to achieve? What processes lead to the desired results and, can the results be replicated, and how? With a

clear strategy and understanding of progress, we can guide and adjust actions mid-stream. This sequence is essential to progress further in maintaining the alignment to results, and continuing to work toward effective implementation and management of development effectiveness as a whole.

6. Results Orientation and Accountability for Whom?

A discussion of results orientation and accountability within the government and with donor agencies would not be complete without mentioning a few questions that have been raised at various points in time. These include debates about: Who are we promoting results orientation and accountability for, and why? Is managing for results being promoted to enable countries to continue to access donor resources, or to ensure that quantitative, qualitative, and sustainable development is built and strengthened in the country?

Recently, the framework to drive reforms in Uganda has been carried out through the Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC). There are currently two results matrixes – one promoted by the World Bank, and a good governance matrix promoted primarily by bilateral donors. These two matrixes complement each other in terms of donor decisions. Together, these matrixes have been used to measure overall government performance underpinned by whether the government was able to achieve agreed-on prior actions (conditionalities).

The World Bank and bilateral donors were able to marshal a team of over 30 sector experts to look for evidence across sectors of interest (health; water; education; decentralization; and justice, law and order; etc.) and in areas like public financial management, procurement, and so on. Through the PRSC process, accountability was externally driven through donor demand. In order to obtain the PRSC facility, the Government of Uganda was obliged to pass the test for “successfully implemented” for all prior actions. In addition, the government also had to fulfil the conditionality actions of the IMF and the good governance matrix.

The government has recently started a process of building a government-owned review framework based on the PEAP Results and Policy Matrix. This matrix replaces the PRSC and good governance matrixes and any other action matrix that is driven by donors. Accountability has evolved and is now tied to central government institutions; results orientation is tied less to donor mechanisms and more to the constitution and other government accountability regulatory frameworks. Some donors have developed the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy as a response



mechanism to the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and its emerging monitoring, review and evaluation framework. Donors are not expected to set up individual monitoring and evaluation systems, but to work through the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy developed by the government.

Challenges

The PRSC matrix was crucial to the World Bank, and most bilateral donors tied their performance measurement of the Government of Uganda to this matrix. A huge investment supported the PRSC process and it was able to run adequately through PRSC 1, 2, 3, and 4. During PRSC5, with the establishment of the government monitoring mechanism through the PEAP Results and Policy Review framework, the World Bank reassigned this type of investment to the country. There were signs of a reduced emphasis observed during the PRSC process. During the PRSC process there was great rigour of analysis done by the PRSC experts, but with the reassignment of this resource, there are questions as to whether the government alone will be able to manage and perform these functions adequately and generate the quality of analysis required.

There is a need to manage expectations – and the question is, what happens if the government is not able to exhibit the same rigour of analysis that was part of the PRSC process in the past?

How far are development partners willing to go to support national M&E systems in terms of transferring the requisite capacities and ensuring that the agenda is driven by the national government rather than the partners? In the process of ensuring that countries manage for development results, the real issue is the need to consider how to make these M&E systems efficient, effective and sustainable.

Operationalizing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness demands that donors enhance their interest in the processes of results orientation as countries embark on building and strengthening country-owned review mechanisms.

7. Incentive Structure

A results orientation can work better if it is well linked to some incentive structure. The question here is what is the framework of incentives at hand? For some time now, sector reviews in the social sectors have worked very well. However, the review of national policy based on a small number of performing sectors (mainly the social sectors) is not optimal. By design, what matters to sectors like education or water would be the sector review process. But understanding re-

sults orientation across an entire government framework cannot be based entirely on the performance of the water or education sector alone; it has to be carried out across the public sector system altogether. Therefore, there is a need to study the incentive framework to ensure that comprehensive review of national policy and service delivery is carried out in an efficient manner.

Secondly, experience in Uganda reveals that focussing at the outcome or impact level does not entirely provide the mechanism for managing public services. It is not right to state that focussing on impacts will enhance the development of results orientation in the sector. The outcome focus is now reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) approach. It is possible to attain these goals without attaining the enhanced performance of the public sector. There is a need to review achievements across the chain of results. Therefore one questions how the concept of performance contracts can come in, so that we do not react but act on evidence of performance. The issue of performance contracts is useful if we are to ensure that results are used for mutual accountability.

Thirdly, donor harmonization at the country level is just a myth. The strategies for donor harmonization are not strong enough because individual donors are not willing to let go of their institutional bureaucratic requirements to allow national governments to own and lead results. In Uganda, there is still competition among most of the donor processes. Who should set the incentive framework for harmonization, the government or donors? How do we exploit the comparative advantage of different donors in financing various government programs or particular sectors? These are questions that are worth consideration by all stakeholders involved.

Conclusion

To finance public policies and programs in Uganda, resources are needed. The two main sources to finance government are internally-raised revenue and external aid. But, whether internally or externally raised, some tax payer finances the government budget. It is therefore prudent for public sector management to set in place mechanisms that make accountability go beyond the nominal financial management accountability. Public sector managers (whether aid recipient country or donor institutions) are obligated to account along the results chain, and politicians (whether aid recipient country or donor country) must account to the citizens around the same chain of results. The principle should then be to build a framework of results that is agreeable to all stakeholders, develop robust results management systems, and hold all stakeholders mutually



accountable for results. This is the effort Uganda is striving to continue to achieve. With an enormous lead to alignment for results in the Africa Region, Uganda strives to keep its momentum in its orientation and achievement of results in the context of a changing policy environment.

For more information

Contact: Peter M. Ssentongo, Assistant Commissioner for Coordination and Monitoring, Government of Uganda

E-mail: peter.sentongo@nimes.go.ug

Contact: Rema Nair Balasundaram, Consultant, Operational Policy and Country Services, World Bank

E-mail: rbalasundaram@worldbank.org

