

## Timor-Leste: Managing for Results in a Fragile Postconflict Setting <sup>25</sup>

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### Executive Summary

**T**his example of Managing for Development Results addresses the question: To what extent is the Timor-Leste government ready to manage and monitor the achievement of its national development plan and donor contributions?

Timor-Leste has focused squarely on implementation of its National Development Plan since national independence in May 2002. The development plan was followed up by formulation of a detailed “road map” for 2002–07. In 2004, the government elaborated sector investment programs to improve sectoral donor coordination around the National Development Plan. To monitor progress, the five-year road map is followed by annual action plans. On a quarterly basis, line agencies report on the implementation progress of their annual plans. In turn, the Ministry of Planning and Finance combines all information electronically to prepare quarterly reports. These are distributed to donors, line agencies, and other stakeholders. This task represents an impressive accomplishment for such a young nation – a first win in managing for results, the establishment of a culture of monitoring and accountability.

This story illustrates how the world’s newest country is making inroads into managing for results with partners’ support.

### Key successes:

- Applying a phased approach to M&E to manage for results.
- Partnering with and among donors, enabling everyone to move forward with one voice.
- The government’s commitment to incorporate M&E in sector investment programs, and linking it to policies and budget execution. This was another important “win” for the government and the stakeholders, presenting the government as a champion for results.
- Transferring knowledge, which is a major component of support received from donors.
- Lessons learned during this process have wide applicability not only in other Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), but in other contexts as well. A major lesson to date is that managing for results and the use of information for learning and decision making is more likely to be accepted if presented as a phase-in process rather than as an all-or-nothing deal.

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<sup>25</sup> This case study draws information from field observations, year 2004 appraisal and progress aide-memoires, and communication with Elisabeth Huybens, Country Manager, and Adrian Fozzard, Economist, World Bank. It also builds on World Bank’s approach to working in LICUS countries.



## The Need for Results in Postconflict Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony from the sixteenth century until 1975, and then was occupied by Indonesia until 1999. In August of 1999, 79 percent of the population voted to become an independent nation and 21 percent voted for integration with Indonesia. Between September 4, 1999, when the results of the voting became known, and September 20, members of the pro-integration faction destroyed over 80 percent of houses and public buildings, including more than two-thirds of health facilities and schools, and more than 1,500 people were killed. In the period that followed, almost half of the population of 850,000 was displaced – about 260,000 to West-Timor (where 30,000 have stayed), 25,000 to Australia, and 190,000 to the hills and mountains.

On September 17, 1999, the Indonesian Government accepted assistance from the international community to restore peace and security in Timor-Leste. A multinational military force was deployed by September 20, and a month later the United Nations Transitional Authority of East-Timor was formed. On Independence Day – May 20, 2002 – the transitional authority was transformed into the United Nations Mission of Support in East-Timor.

The first democratic, multiparty constituent assembly of the new state met in August 2001. In April 2002, a president was selected through open elections, instituting parliamentary democracy as the form of government.


By the end of 2004, Timor-Leste had made remarkable progress in establishing governing bodies. Much remains to be done in the area of governance and even more in public sector management. Nevertheless, the country is largely stable and economic policies are evolving toward a market economy with varying degrees of government intervention.

The World Bank report *Partnerships in Development* points out that countries coming out of conflict face a 40 percent chance of relapsing within the first five years of peace. The Managing for Development Results approach seeks to address that challenge through sustained improvement in country-level development outcomes, as reflected the Millennium Development Goals.

Managing for Development Results (MfDR) is an iterative process in which governments and agencies move the emphasis away from inputs and processes toward results – key policy milestones, outcomes, and,

eventually, assessment of the impact of development interventions and knowledge transfer. The process begins with a focus on short-term outcomes, gradually moving along a continuum to medium- and long-term outcomes, and finally to country development goals. At any given time, different programs maybe at different stages in the continuum. (See Figure 1.)

**Figure 1. Managing for Results: A Phase-in Approach for Fragile Transition States<sup>26</sup>**



Timor-Leste has adopted strong internal reform programs, but must then contend with high political risk and weak institutional capacity. A “phase-in approach” to MfDR provides an enabling tool that assists with preparation and monitoring of poverty reduction strategies. It also helps the country prepare itself for transition support from the International Development Association (IDA) aimed at achieving results on the ground.

Fragile states such as Timor-Leste typically adopt strong internal reform programs, but then must contend with high political risk and weak institutional capacity. The phase-in approach to MfDR recognizes, first, that institutional, social and behavioral change takes time and effort, and second, the development of

<sup>26</sup> World Bank experience in crisis countries has yielded four business models: LICUS with prolonged political crisis, LICUS in fragile transition, LICUS with weak governance and slow progress, and LICUS with deteriorating governance. Timor-Leste meets the definition of countries in fragile transition, where a national reconciliation process or strong internal reform program has created a turnaround policy direction, but capacity remains weak and political risk high. Source: World Bank OPCS, LICUS Unit, May 2004 Corporate Day Presentation.



processes, procedures, and systems is an iterative process that demands commitment, resources, and knowledge transfer in a concerted strategic approach over time. A long-range vision of this sort is no small matter in a country such as Timor Leste, where the word “future” does not exist in its local language.

## Objectives

In 2002, the Timorese parliament adopted a 2020 Vision for Development and a National Development Plan. The vision and plan were the results of a systematic participatory process that involved stakeholders in the entire country in consultations and debates, setting forth basic processes in democratic governance. External stakeholders also played key roles, but they complemented rather than supplanted the national processes.

The 2020 Vision for Development represents a genuine attempt by Timor-Leste to define a program for nation building while defining economic growth and poverty reduction as its development priorities. Finalized in May 2002, the National Development Plan is built upon five priority sectors (education, health, agriculture, economy and employment, and infrastructure) and five crosscutting themes (helping the poor, empowering women and helping youth, peace and reconciliation, cooperation among people, and democracy and good governance). Each sector and theme is presented in terms of goals, challenges, what people say they can do, what people say civil society can do, what people say the government should do, and indicators of progress. The National Development Plan’s objectives and indicators are closely aligned with the Millennium Development Goals and its indicators

## Designing and Implementing a Postconflict Transition Strategy

In early 2003, the government set priorities for implementing its national development plan, developing a “road map” for the years 2002 through 2007. Annual action plans were set up to guide the allocation of resources to government agencies for each year. Shortly thereafter, the government, with partners’ support, began to prepare sector investment plans to establish sector priorities, raise funding to implement the plans, and improve donor sector coordination.

**Developing a National Development Plan and Transition Support Strategy:** Consistent with the national development plan which emerged through a participatory, consultative process (see box), a donor-assisted Transition Support Strategy was approved in 2000, as well as priorities for stability.

## Participatory Process in Creating a National Development Plan

The Timor-Leste 2020 National Development Plan was prepared through a participatory and consultative process that included workshops with civil leaders and NGOs and consultations with more than 38,000 men, women, and youth. Input came from a variety of sources:

- Village chiefs
- 1,800 households
- Communities in 48 villages
- 980 consultations in 498 villages that yielded 2,050 surveys
- “Postcards to the President” from 5,443 secondary school students

The World Bank has coordinated the transition support program and a budget support operation, which is cofinanced by the Bank and 10 development partners. The Bank provides about US\$ 5 million per year for this program, with total annual pledges reaching about US\$ 30 million.

**Pillars of the Transition Support Program.** Timor-Leste’s Transition Support Program rests on three pillars:

- **Job creation** – A regulatory framework, job creation initiatives, and agricultural productivity.
- **Basic services** – Health, education, and social protection; infrastructure, transport and power; agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and the environment; and assistance to veterans.
- **Governance** – Parliament, government finances, rule of law, public sector accountability, and environment and natural resources.

**Need and donor support for M&E.** The transition strategy and support program also address cross-pillar themes – M&E, gender, capacity building, and overall institutional strengthening. With donors support, the government is starting to embrace not only M&E but the notion of *results-focused* M&E in support of the national development plan.

At the government’s request, the World Bank formally reviewed and commented upon the 15 sector investment programs as well as the crosscutting issues of M&E and gender.<sup>27</sup> It was noted that only a handful of the sector investment programs significantly incorporated M&E or indicators.

<sup>27</sup>The Monitoring and Evaluation Note (a review of 15 sector investment programs) was prepared by Rosalía Rodríguez-García, OPCS-Results Secretariat, World Bank, November 2004.



## Problems, Progress, and Factors for Success

Experience in developed, middle-income, and low-income countries points to several key elements that are critical to many countries' ability to improve public sector performance and monitoring of development results. In Timor-Leste, these factors help to explain many of the problems that have been encountered, progress that has been made, and factors that will ensure longer-term achievement of goals.

**Champions for results.** There are no visible political “champions for results” in Timor-Leste, although line ministers such as the Minister of Health are increasingly vocal about the need to *show* results. Champions for performance who use information on a routine basis are needed at the top echelons. Such champions may emerge as data analysis deepens and data presentation is adapted to the needs of senior managers and policy makers. The availability of effectively presented data will reinforce decision making, accountability, and transparency by routinely placing performance on the agenda of the Council of Ministers, Parliament, and other key decision-making bodies. Informed policy formulation and review will be encouraged by the routine review of periodic data within ministries for programmatic problem solving and decision making.

**Demand and use of information.** Presently, information demand in Timor-Leste is chiefly donor driven; however, evidence suggests that the parliament and civil society are starting to pressure the government for monitoring data. Information for decision making in government ministries and the public sector in general needs to increase.

To achieve greater transparency, the government called key Timorese stakeholders in August 2003 to help monitor of the National Development Plan. NGOs, academic institutions, faith-based groups, elected officials, and others were included. A committee of participant volunteers was to have prepared terms of reference to create a high-level mechanism by the end of 2003. Although the group was formed, it achieved little. Lack of leadership, difficult access to information, and a vague mandate are among shortcomings that evidently hindered its success.

**Alignment of processes and procedures with budget.** Processes and procedures need to be aligned to budget and results for improved performance. It is anticipated that starting in the 2004/05 fiscal year, budget documentation will include information on the goals, objectives, indicators, and expected performance of government units. Spearheaded by the Council of Ministers, this effort will enhance overall accountabil-

ity for delivery of goods and services in the public sector and will better align government performance to budget execution.

With the budget playing this anchor role, the key elements of a performance monitoring architecture are more feasible, including clarity on the roles and responsibilities of central and line agencies, donors, and NGOs. This architecture would facilitate the involvement of sector working groups in the review of the national development plan. It would guide the consolidation of budgets and prioritize capacity-building activities with donors. Aligning the central Ministry of Planning monitoring system would greatly help the system to respond to the needs of results-driven financial monitoring. The system will become more selective by shifting from activity tracking toward program milestone and results monitoring.

The government's track record in encouraging planning and monitoring and its acknowledgement of the need to evaluate the progress made by the five-year NDP Road Map are other motivating factors critical in managing for results. The Ministry of Planning and Finance understands that it needs to focus on better aligning the National Development Plan's goals, the annual action plans and targets, and the sector investment programs, with budget performance and the activities being monitored.

**Indicators and baselines.** Quantified indicators and baselines are critical in monitoring progress toward results. As might be expected, the young public sector of Timor-Leste takes a short-term perspective on monitoring. The government and the World Bank took a critical step by incorporating a mid-term review in the monitoring matrix for the 2004/05 transition support program. This helped shift the focus of discussion toward achievement of milestones and service provision objectives – another “win”.

Understandably, government agencies were initially reluctant to set quantitative targets without reliable baselines for all indicators. However, with the 2003 Demographic and Health Survey and the 2004 national census, data are now available. Indicators can increasingly be quantified, including baselines agreed upon through discussion between the government and donors. With the benefit of hindsight, one wishes that donors had supported baselines on core indicators selected from the National Development Plan, rather than indicators chosen by the funding agencies. The identification of reliable baselines for core National Development Plan indicators is essential for the government's plan to evaluate its Road Map for the development plan. Data from the Demographic and Health Survey and from the census should provide



some but not all baselines for the core indicators that the government needs.

**Information systems and supply of information.** The timely supply of quality information is essential to managing for results, yet routine information is often questionable and survey information sporadic. The Ministry of Finance and Planning's effort to coordinate key public sector management functions is noteworthy. As expected in a transition situation, monitoring revolves around process indicators and activities. Substantial technical assistance was provided by donors, and progress is evident in making monitoring integral to planning and management. The existence of an electronic data reporting system for the whole of government and a registry that compiles donor-related funding information is remarkable for such a young country with limited capacity. These data management systems have been consolidated into one, and training for line agencies on how to use these is provided by the Ministry of Planning and Finance. Data processing systems of annual action plans are centralized to ensure quality control; however, centralization could prevent line agencies and ministries from taking on accountability for their own performance.

The quarterly monitoring system housed at the Ministry of Finance and Planning tracks activities completed across government entities with much detail. This raises the question of whether a centralized system that is activity-based can provide the strategic information needed for policy and management decisions. Would it become unwieldy and hard to manage over time? Ideally, the system should allow senior policymakers to focus on critical elements of a broad program by using key poverty or Millennium Development Goal indicators. Experience suggests the need for a hierarchy of outputs and key milestones. Only the most important of these need to be monitored and reported at a cross-governmental level. Activities and services statistics are more relevant to program managers and sector ministers than to the Ministry of Planning and Finance.

**Information dissemination to the public.** Routine proactive communication through radio and other media can inform the public about government actions, and it can help the government establish itself as transparent and accountable in regard to public service. A Government Information Office was launched to take the lead by anticipating and responding to information demands.

**Country capacity to manage and use statistics.** A strong statistics unit at the central level and in line agencies is an important enabler in Managing for Development Results. The National Statistics Directorate is responsible for the census; demographic break-

downs on population and gender; economic statistics on consumer prices, banking, and financial services; and data for national accounts (which have not been prepared for the past three years). This unit is strong within the limits of its available human capital and resources. It does not need generalized capacity building, but rather strategic institution building to include statistical training and analytical coaching for staff.

**Country capacity for Monitoring and Evaluation.** Competent monitoring and honest reporting on indicators lie at the heart of international agreements on the Millennium Development Goals. Timely, reliable statistics are also the key to a results-based management process. In Timor-Leste, tools such as computers, software data management packages, and printers are available. What's missing is the know-how on how to apply basic quality standards to collecting and managing data and for data analysis. Routine use of information for decision making is also not yet institutionalized. Timor-Leste may require additional strategic technical assistance in the medium and longer term to maintain its current standards of public sector management and monitoring and to implement capacity improvements geared toward strategic institution building.<sup>28</sup>

## Results Achieved

Timor-Leste is advancing slowly but steadily along the Managing for Results continuum. Many fundamental building blocks are in place, such as annual planning and quarterly reporting linked in the foreseeable future to the budget. While some sectors are more advanced along the continuum than others, the country overall is in the first stage – monitoring the inputs, outputs, and key milestones (policy frameworks, processes and procedures) – that are critical to establishing an enabling environment for measuring and monitoring results on the ground.

Early results are mixed yet significant:

- Management systems, especially in the Ministry of Planning and Finance, are progressing toward the idea that achievement of results belongs at the center of planning, implementation, and budget allocations.
- For purposes of evaluation, most sectors are able to monitor service indicators, though only a few

<sup>28</sup> Donors' capacity-building support is varied. For instance, UNDP provides broad capacity-building assistance, UNICEF is offering training in the use of DevpInfo (a software package), and FAO is working with the Ministry of Agriculture to plan and execute agricultural census and surveys.



(such as health) can monitor coverage indicators. Overall, there is limited capacity to monitor outcomes.

- Capacity building for institution strengthening, including the establishment of computerized information systems, is under way. The National Statistics Directorate demonstrated impressive skill in its execution of the national census. Line agencies such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture are strengthening their data generation and processing capacities, and the utilization of data for policymaking and program monitoring.
- The government is managing its burden of reporting to multiple development agencies. Reporting requirements are somewhat more manageable because for the Transition Support Program (TSP) donors have consolidated their demands so that only one report is required. Reporting requirements for the TSP provide the basis to monitor progress. This system provided the basis for the government's internal reporting system, including a quarterly report on budget execution—a very important “win”.
- The process of identifying and disseminating relevant lessons and knowledge is only beginning.
- Timor-Leste has established core planning and resource management functions that are effective and transparent. They compare favorably with those of other low-income postconflict countries. Yet these functions have relied heavily on international technical assistance. To consolidate gains, the next round of effort needs to focus on institution building aimed at improving sustainability.

## Lessons Learned

### *Donors need to hold to the line on cooperation.*

Timor-Leste is providing critical lessons in the areas of donor cooperation and monitoring of activities, a first step in managing for results. With respect to donor cooperation, this experience has demonstrated that partnerships – between government and donors, as well as among donors – enable everyone to move in the same direction. The consolidation of support for the transition, including its monitoring, has helped to establish a culture of cooperation. In response to the crisis period, donors took an important step by coordinating support. Yet, as the situation has stabilized, some donors appear to be backsliding toward the corporate mode of separate priorities rather than responsiveness to a cooperative agenda. Donor cooperation needs to be strengthened, and donors need to lead the way in practicing the principles they abide by.

### *Managing for Development Results can be conceptualized and implemented in phases along a continuum.*

Applying Managing for Results in phases enables countries like Timor-Leste to master one level of monitoring before moving on to the next. This follows a natural progression – from management of inputs and critical milestones to the management of outputs and short-term outcomes; and then on to medium-term outcomes, long-term outcomes, and finally, overall impact. By focusing on a few critical steps at a time, fundamental building blocks are put in place. For instance, the government first publicly acknowledged the importance of monitoring and evaluation. Recognition was followed by assertion that the issue needed to be addressed by working groups on sectoral investment programs. This was a critical step forward in advancing an institutional culture and mechanisms to manage for results in each of these sectors – another important “win.”

### *M&E results must reflect and link directly to government priorities.*

Linking M&E results to government priorities opens doors for rapid progress. For example, the Ministry of Planning and Finance now understands the need to better align the goals of the National Development Plan and its annual action plans and targets with budget performance and the activities that are being monitored.

### *Knowledge transfer is as valuable as “hard” financial support, but far harder to assess.*

In Timor-Leste, donors such as the World Bank have made important contributions through the transfer of knowledge, skills, and lessons from other countries. The experience of Timor-Leste demonstrates that results related to knowledge transfer are as vital as results derived from financial support through grants, lending, and budget support. But what are the techniques to monitor the transfer of policy and knowledge? What are its milestones, outputs, and outcomes? Questions such as these pose an enticing challenge on the conceptual and operational frontiers.

## Conclusion and Applicability to Other Programs

The World Bank's approach to working with low-income postconflict fragile countries underscores the need for institutional reform and partnerships. It recognizes other critical needs as well: the importance of staying engaged, anchoring strategies in strong socio-political analysis, promoting domestic demand and capacity for positive change, supporting simple and feasible entry-level reforms, exploring innovative mechanisms for service delivery, and working closely with donors.



At this juncture, three areas of engagement are particularly relevant in Timor-Leste: capacity building to generate, process, and analyze data; strategic entry-level reforms that anchor the use of results information in policy analysis; and coordination of donor efforts with respect to M&E issues, indicators, reporting, and statistical capacity building.

Despite commendable donor efforts to support technical innovation such as Management Information Systems, the deeply institutionalized use of knowledge is harder to engrain. Timor-Leste highlights the need to assess service delivery, and beyond that, the effects of knowledge transfer as well. Both are essential to the achievement of development results on the ground.

Finally, Timor-Leste illustrates several considerations that distinguish low-income postconflict countries from other developing countries that advance on the road toward managing for results:

- An M&E system is not normally based on surveys because field-based surveys are not normally geared toward generating routine information for management and decision making. Surveys are a necessary but insufficient element of performance monitoring. The situation and needs are different in low-income fragile countries. Monitoring through surveys may be necessary at a very early stage in order to verify baselines and define outcomes on the ground. Surveys may in fact be needed while information systems are being established and strengthened in parallel.
- Fragile new states such as Timor-Leste require concerted support from the development community early on. Cognizant of the fragility of the social and economic systems, compounded by weak institutions and lack of infrastructure, the international community provides technical advisors who provide substantial assistance. Not all international advisors perform at the same level of proficiency, but they do contribute a great deal of stability and skill. Withdrawal of longer-term advisors should be carefully phased, in order to avoid costly gaps in skills and confidence.
- Replacing long-term international advisors with short-term players—coach consultants creates a different set of problems—most notably, short-term consultants rarely provide stability or long-term follow up. Consultants often have differing approaches to M&E. As short-term consultants come and go, the overall process of institution building in M&E is affected in different ways, including misunderstanding and confusion related to concepts, terminology, and standards of practice. If donors address this challenge head on by focusing on sustained, coordinated institution building,

fragile countries such as Timor-Leste will benefit greatly. Donors need to invest far more effort in harmonizing their strategies for strengthening M&E capacity.

### Summary: How MfDR Principles were Applied in Timor-Leste

*1. At all phases – from strategic planning through implementation to completion and beyond – focus the dialogue on results for partner countries, development agencies, and other stakeholders.*

- Strong strategic partnerships between the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the government on the one hand, and development partners on the other, focused explicitly on supporting the government to achieve results, and were key to the relative success of the joint donor assistance efforts.
- Donor partnerships with UNTAET and the transition governments were also guided by 6-month action matrix. This action matrix provided a time-bound framework for all critical achievements irrespective of individual partners.

*2. Align actual programming, monitoring, and evaluation activities with the agreed expected results.*

- A results-focused, whole-of-government approach was initiated early on. The elected government took firm leadership of the implementation of the national development plan (NDP). The NDP subscribes to the MDGs.
- The NDP defines sustainable growth and poverty reduction as its overriding goals, setting out a macroeconomic framework and medium-term expenditures framework. To make the NDP more concrete, the government recently developed 14 sector investment plans and is launching sector working groups for their implementation.
- Guided by the NDP, each public sector agency prepares annual action plans (AAP) covering priority actions. Budget execution is then linked to AAPs for all government units.
- AAPs are monitored by a quarterly reporting matrix. An electronic system processes the data and supports the production of quarterly monitoring reports that are shared with stakeholders.
- The transition support programs (TSP) and TSP action matrix were aligned to the NDP to strive to achieve time-bound results.

*3. Keep the results reporting system as simple, cost-effective, and user-friendly as possible.*

- This early M&E system includes key milestones and output indicators. This is seemingly because in



an emerging country it is important to make explicit key stepping stones (i.e., a new school curriculum; a new law) toward outcomes, which otherwise may not be fully completed.

- The system also includes outcomes indicators as possible. The thrust has been on “pushing the envelope” but always with counterparts, to ensure ownership and to keep the system user-friendly.
- In some sectors, outcome indicators remain a challenge in an environment in which survey and sector administrative statistical services are weak.

#### 4. *Manage for, not by, results, by arranging resources to achieve outcomes.*

- TSPs promote a results orientation through a time-bound matrix of actions, and by instilling discipline in an environment in which internal disciplinary mechanisms are still weak.
- TSPs support whole-of-government strategic annual plans.
- The government uses the TSPs to strengthen donor coordination by involving the majority of development partners in the preparation and monitoring of the action matrix, thus providing an anchor for monitoring the results of donor-supported and government-supported activities.

#### 5. *Use results information for management learning and decision making, as well as for reporting and accountability.*

- Information is used by sectors and the government overall, but a better rationalization of the type of information that is needed at different levels is necessary.
- Civil society members are consulted in monitoring the matrix.

### **Update on Implementation of the Results Framework – Rosalía Rodríguez-García, World Bank, November 2005**

Of countries that have emerged from large civil unrest, Timor-Leste is an interesting case of building government capacity and institutions from scratch. The country is continuing to make good progress in managing for results as it implements its NDP and sector strategies.

In 2006 a new Household Survey will be carried out which will allow comparison with the 2000 baseline. Data from the 2003 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) and 2004 census have now been processed and highlight the enormous challenges ahead ensuing from a higher population than previously estimated and the highest fertility rate ever recorded in a DHS. (Population growth rate is estimated at 4 percent.)

The process of rationalizing investment and support in specific sectors continues through the established 15 Sector Working Groups. The challenge ahead will be to ensure a good link between the sector M&E system, the national monitoring system, and budget allocation entities (the Ministry of Finance and aid agencies); to develop a set of indicators for the sectors themselves to monitor the implementation process; and to widen participation of civil society.

The new Consolidation Support Program (CSP) which is supported by the World Bank and other development partners has deepened its results orientation, building on the efforts of the preceding operation. The CSP is being used by the government and the Prime Minister himself for high level national results monitoring. In fact, the Prime Minister’s presentation this year at the World Summit in the UN focused on reporting on progress in the key CSP areas. The 3-year CSP and the CAS show managing for results as one of the four pillars underscoring the rules of engagement between donors and the governments.

As the country engages in the review of results achieved thus far in the context of designing the next National Development Plan (NDP) there will be opportunities for refining both the monitoring and the evaluative components of M&E to deepen the monitoring of the NDP implementation. Strengthening the capacity of Timorese institutions to plan, implement, and monitor the achievement of their national goals is likely to remain a challenge due to the educational level of civil servants and the increased performance demands that will be experienced by institutions due to population growth, among others.

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